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AN ALTERNATIVE TO CENTRALIZATION
INTRODUCTION
Centralization of the authority and powers of State Boards 
of Accountancy is a serious threat to effective state regula­
tion of the profession. In the past decade, centralization 
of professional licensing boards has resulted from the re­
organization of many state governments’ executive branches.
Centralization is carried out in the name of efficient and 
more economical operation of agencies of the state govern­
ment, such as State Boards of Accountancy. Often, however, 
the real result is that independent and effective profes­
sional licensing boards are subsumed into large bureaucratic 
organizations and lose their effectiveness, rule-making 
authority, and control over the profession. Formerly, inde­
pendent professional licensing boards may become advisory 
bodies with no meaningful power and authority.
This paper recommends a realistic alternative to centralization. 
The alternative offers a new dimension in the public interest -- 
a Public Oversight Board for State Professional Licensing Boards. 
Also, the alternative proposal should achieve the same cost 
saving benefits of centralization while the advantages of inde­
pendent professional licensing boards are retained.
This paper lists, in Section D, the advantages of the alternative 
concept presented. The alternative proposed is reasonable, prac­
tical and worthy of serious consideration and subsequent adoption 
by state governments throughout the United States.
A companion paper, Dealing With Centralization, proposes a 
step-by-step program for opposing centralization of State Boards 
of Accountancy.
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A. A Public Oversight Board for State Professional
Licensing Boards
Professional licensing has many public interest aspects; 
it is in the public interest to provide for public over­
sight of professional licensing boards such as accountancy, 
health professions, architects, and engineers. The pro­
posed Public Oversight Board would actively monitor all 
aspects of professional licensing and regulation in a state.
The Public Oversight Board’s monitoring of professional 
licensing boards might include:
1. Attending licensing board meetings with 
privileges of the floor extended
2. Reading licensing board minutes and publicly 
available material
3. Reviewing publicly available investigatory 
and disciplinary reports
4. Reviewing licensing board regulations and 
activities for the purpose of evaluating 
their fidelity to the legislative intent 
of the licensing statutes
5. Evaluating licensing board responses to 
complaints
6. Issuing public comment upon licensing board’s 
activities, rules, and disciplinary actions 
in the public interest
7. Overseeing the key aspects of professional 
licensing.
Because it would have no direct or indirect control over the 
state’s professional licensing boards, the Public Oversight 
Board’s status as the watchdog and commentator on the public 
interest aspects of the activities of the boards would be 
enhanced.
The Public Oversight Board should consist of between nine and 
fifteen individuals appointed by the Governor with the advice 
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and consent of the State Senate. The Board would report 
directly to the Governor and the legislature on profes­
sional licensing activities, disciplinary actions taken 
by the licensing boards, and trends observed, if any, 
in professional licensing and regulation. It would have 
a staff adequate to serve its administrative needs such 
as minutes of meetings, meeting arrangements, liaison 
with all professional boards overseen, and correspondence. 
Nominal compensation for oversight board members, operating 
expenses, and staff salaries would be provided by annual 
assessments against each professional licensing board overseen.
B. Professional Licensing Boards
Each professional licensing board would be continued as an 
independent entity with control, responsibility, and authority 
over the following matters:
1. Promulgating rules
2. Administering professional examinations
3. Evaluating candidates' education
4. Evaluating candidates' experience, if required
5. Authorizing issuance of original, renewal, and 
reciprocal professional licenses
6. Maintaining professional standards
7. Administering Continuing Professional Education
8. Investigating complaints
9. Disciplining licensees
10. Responding to public inquiries
11. Funding its activities through an adequate 
fee structure.
Each professional licensing board would consist of licensees 
of the profession appointed by the Governor. The number of 
board members would be determined consistent with each state's 
preferences. Each board would be responsible directly to 
the Governor and would submit an annual report to the Governor 
and the legislature. Each board would have staff sufficient 
to fulfill its statutory obligations.
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C• Central Licensing Service Bureau
The cost saving benefits of centralization can be achieved 
by consolidating clerical functions in a Central Licensing 
Service Bureau. The Bureau would provide each of the pro­
fessional licensing boards with clerical services such as:
1. Receiving applications for original, renewal, and 
reciprocal licensing credentials
2. Preparing original, renewal, and reciprocal pro­
fessional licensing credentials as approved by 
each board
3. Checking CPE compliance forms for referral to 
each board for approval
4. Processing data
5. General clerical services as required by each 
professional licensing board.
Funding for the Central Licensing Service Bureau would be 
provided by annual assessments against each professional 
licensing board which the Bureau services.
D. Advantages of the Public Oversight Board Concept
The concept of a Public Oversight Board, retention of 
independent professional licensing boards, and creation 
of a Central Licensing Service Bureau has several advan­
tages over centralization of authority and functions of 
professional licensing in a large central bureaucratic 
agency. The advantages are:
1. The Public Oversight Board, since it has no direct 
control over professional licensing, can speak with 
an independent voice on the public interest aspects 
of the boards it oversees
2. Responsibility for professional licensing and regula­
tion is retained by each professional licensing board
3. Economies of scale and efficiencies of centralized 
clerical staff are realized by the service bureau 
concept
4. Licensing and regulation of each profession is 
completely self-supporting through an adequate 
licensing fee structure which supports the pro­
fessional licensing boards and, through assessments 
on each board, the Public Oversight Board and the 
Central Licensing Service Bureau.
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E. A Final Word
If your State CPA Society and State Board of Accountancy 
decide to oppose centralization of professional licensing 
functions and authority, or to propose an alternative 
concept, such as the one suggested in this paper, careful 
and thorough preparation is an absolute requirement. The 
forces driving the centralization movement in a particular 
state may be so powerful that only the most throughly pre­
pared program of opposition, or proposing an laterntive, 
will have any chance of success.
It is difficult to oppose a proposal which promises extensive 
savings of state funds unless you show that the reality of 
those savings is subject to challenge and that a reasonable 
alternative to centralization exists. Only by showing the 
disadvantages and limitations of a proposed centralization 
program can an opposition movement succeed or an alternative 
program be adopted.
